

Cato Networks:

The Cato CTRL SASE Threat Report

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Executive Summary

Below are key takeaways from this quarter's analysis:

AI takes the enterprise by storm

The most common AI tools used among enterprises were Microsoft Copilot, OpenAI ChatGPT, and Emol, an application that records emotions and talks with AI robots. The strongest adoption of these tools was seen in the travel & tourism industry (79%), and the lowest adoption among entertainment organizations (44%).

Get a peek into the hacker underground

As part of its research, Cato CTRL monitors discussions from various hacker forums. The report found attackers discussing how to jailbreak ChatGPT to create custom SQLMap commands. We spotted advertisements for services for generating fake credentials and creating deep fakes. We also continued to monitor recruitment for creating a malicious ChatGPT.

Beware of where you shop

Threat actors are setting up domains that mimic well-known brands. Booking, Amazon, and eBay are the most spoofed brands.

Enterprises are too trusting within their networks

Many enterprises continue to run unsecured protocols across their WAN, with 62% of all web application traffic being HTTP, 54% of all traffic being telnet, and 46% of all traffic being SMB v1 or v2 instead of SMBv3. Lateral movement—where attackers will move across networks—was identified particularly in the agriculture, real estate, and travel and tourism industries.

Zero-day is the least of your problems

While we in the industry pay a lot of attention to zero-day threats the reality is that threat actors are often trying to exploit unpatched systems, eschewing the use of the latest vulnerabilities and instead exploiting unpatched systems. For example, three years after its discovery, Log4J (CVE-2021-44228) remains one of the most used exploits.

Security varies between industries

Vulnerabilities and techniques are common across industries, but there are ones specific to industries. Entertainment, Telecommunication, and Mining & Metals are being targeted with T1499 – Endpoint Denial of Service techniques more than other sectors. In the Services and Hospitality sectors, threat actors utilize the T1212—Exploitation for Credential Access more than in other sectors. Finally, 50% of media and entertainment organizations don't use information security tools.

Even benign activity is becoming suspicious

As attackers evolve their techniques, they use actions and methods that might otherwise be considered benign. How can organizations detect and stop them before it's too late? Through a deep understanding of network traffic patterns and the use of AI/ML algorithms, Cato has developed suspicious activity monitoring (SAM) for this very reason.

A case in point is dynamic DNS services traffic. Nearly half (44%) of organizations have outbound traffic to dynamic DNS. Alone, dynamic DNS traffic should not be blocked, as there are legitimate uses. However, many attackers rely on dynamic DNS for their activities. By understanding the greater context around dynamic DNS traffic, organizations can identify whether or not this traffic is malicious.

The “Un”adoption of DNSSEC

Our data indicates that only 1% of DNS traffic utilizes Secure DNS. We believe this is primarily due to DNS being a critical component of both the internet and organizational operations. Organizations fear that implementation complexities might result in misconfigurations, potentially disrupting their applications and services.

Introduction

Threat actors are always evolving. Whether it is nation-state actors, cybercrime groups, ransomware gangs, or niche teams targeting specific systems – new tools, techniques, and procedures are constantly introduced by attackers. Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) remains fragmented and isolated to point solutions rather than being collected and analyzed with a holistic view that includes external data, inbound (and outbound) threats, and network activity (WANbound). Without such a holistic view it's difficult to accurately evaluate the true state of cybersecurity within enterprises.

To address that need, Cato CTRL, the CTI group of Cato Networks, tapped the data lake underlying Cato SASE Cloud to develop a holistic view of enterprise threats. As the global network, Cato has granular data on every traffic flow from every endpoint communicating across the Cato SASE Cloud platform. This massive data lake is further enriched with hundreds of security feeds and analyzed by proprietary ML/AI algorithms and human intelligence. The result is a unique data repository providing Cato CTRL insights into the security threats and their identifying network characteristics for all traffic, regardless of whether they emanate from or are destined for the Internet or the WAN for all endpoints – sites, remote

users, and cloud resources. Even where Cato's multitiered defense strategy has blocked the attack, the threats are logged and identified, enabling this kind of analysis.

This report summarizes findings Cato CTRL gathered from Cato traffic flows across more than 2,200 customers during the first quarter of 2024. During the quarter, we analyzed 1.26 trillion network flows and blocked 21.45 billion attacks. (To put that in context, that's nearly four times more flows than the 350 billion flows we analyzed for Q1 2022.)

This report offers insights into the threats and suspicious activity across those flows. It also provides strategic, tactical, and operational information on all traffic in all directions utilizing the MITRE ATT&CK framework. In addition, the report highlights the applications, protocols, and tools running on these networks.



About Cato CTRL

Cato CTRL is the only CTI group to fuse threat intelligence with granular network insight made possible by the first and only global SASE platform, the Cato SASE Cloud.

With dozens of former military intelligence analysts, researchers, and data scientists, as well as industry-recognized security professionals, Cato CTRL utilizes network data, security stack data, hundreds of security feeds, human intelligence operations, AI and ML (Machine Learning) models, and more, shedding light on the latest threats and threat actors.

Using industry-standard frameworks such as MITRE ATT&CK, multiple intelligence disciplines, and years of field experience with red and blue team techniques, Cato CTRL conducts the full intelligence lifecycle of collecting, processing, analyzing, and producing cutting-edge CTI. Whether it is tactical data for the SOC, operational threat landscape for managers, or strategic intel for management and board, Cato CTRL has you covered.

Report Structure

This report is divided into six sections

01 General Statistics

This section provides an overview of the general statistics and metrics collected from the private global networks relying on the Cato SASE Cloud Platform.

02 Mitigated Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)

This section discusses the CVEs identified and mitigated within Cato's systems. Highlighted are the proactive measures to address known vulnerabilities and prevent potential exploits.

☐ Suspicious Activity Monitoring (SAM) Security Events

This section explores the security events that might otherwise be considered benign but are identified as being associated with attacks on Cato's SAM system. By analyzing these events, Cato CTRL identifies potential threats, anomalies, and patterns that require further investigation or immediate action.

☐ Enterprise Security Behavior

In this section, Cato CTRL delves into organizations' security behavior, examining the usage of secure and insecure protocols, employee applications, and other relevant data points.

☐ Hacking Communities and AI Tool Usage by Threat Actors

Cato CTRL closely monitors threat actor activities in forums, the dark web, and private chat channels to gain insights into threat actor's latest trends and techniques, and in particular, the growing use of artificial intelligence (AI) tools.

☐ Recommended Actions for Security Improvement

In the final section, Cato CTRL provides actionable recommendations based on the findings from the previous sections.



Section 1


General Statistics

General Statistics

To stop cyberattacks, enterprises should be using house machine learning modules based on company data and threat intelligence feeds. They also need to be careful of compromised systems within their organizations. Threat actors are leveraging them to scan (mainly SMB scanning) the network for vulnerabilities. Lateral movement threats were particularly prominent within lateral movement threats within the agriculture, real estate, and travel & tourism industries. Education experiences more brute force attacks than other industries. Users should continue to be educated about online fraud and phishing when web browsing, particularly when visiting Apple, Amazon, and Booking. The three were the most spoofed brands in our research.

Inbound Threats

The most common type of inbound threat was detected by our reputation engine. Some examples of reputation-based threats found in our research include. IP feeds for exploitation, spam, scanners and malicious domains.




Top Inbound Threats

- Reputation
- Network Scan
- Web Application Attack
- Vulnerability Scan
- Brute Force


When we break down the inbound threats by industry verticals, we see that the healthcare sector leads in web application attacks and scanning activities, while education suffers from the most brute-force attacks of any industry. These attacks are being launched against Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) ports

Inbound Threats by Industry Verticals




Outbound Threats

Network scans (87% of flows associated with outbound threats) were the most common outbound threat, a basic tool for attackers to use in reconnaissance for targets outside the organization. Most attacks are mitigated during the network scan, blocking attempts to scan public services. Most blocked traffic from outbound threats, though, stems from attempts to scan SMB ports.



When analyzing outbound threats across industry verticals, we find that the consulting and media sectors are more vulnerable to exfiltration threats than other sectors. Within the consulting sector, data is more commonly being sent by FTP to low-reputation domains. Regardless of the sector, the most common approach to preventing attacks is being done by Cato's reputation-based mitigation engine.


Outbound Threats by Industry Verticals



Upon examining outbound traffic, it is evident that most attacks are being mitigated during the network scan, indicating that attempts to scan public services are being blocked. Analysis of the data reveals that the majority of the blocked traffic consists of attempts to scan SMB ports.

WANbound Threats

In web application attacks, we witnessed multiple attempts to detect vulnerable web applications by scanning known URLs. We also saw lateral movement in the Windows environment, where attempts were made to use Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to query system information and then execute commands remotely. We also saw heavy use of WinRS Encrypted Execution to hide malicious code in Windows Remote Shell (WinRS) by encrypting it.




Top WANbound Threats

- Network Scan
- Web Application Attack
- Lateral Movement
- Vulnerability Scan
- Remote Code Execution

Agriculture, real estate, and travel & tourism experienced the most lateral-movement-related activities when compared to other industries


WANbound Threats by Industry Verticals



Top Spoofed Brands

Cybercriminals often exploit strong brands in their attacks, using tactics such as phishing and spoofing. Cybersquatting, also known as domain squatting, involves using a domain name to profit from the reputation and recognition of a trademark that belongs to someone else. To combat this issue, Cato Networks has developed a machine-learning algorithm that can successfully detect instances of cybersquatting.

Top Spoofed Brands



Booking, Amazon and Ebay were the top three spoofed brands using at least one of four techniques:

- **Typosquatting** creates domain names that incorporate typical typos users input when attempting to access a legitimate site, such as “catonetwrks.com”, which leaves out the “o” in networks.
- **Combosquatting** creates a domain that combines the legitimate domain with additional words or letters, such as “cato-networks.com”, which adds a hyphen to Cato’s URL catonetworks.com.

- **Levelsquatting** inserts the target domain into the subdomain of the cybersquatting URL, such as login.catonetworks.com.fake.com.
 - **Homographsquatting** uses various character combinations that resemble the target domain visually, such as “catonet0rks.com”, which uses a zero digit that looks like the letter “o.”
- Learn more about Cybersquatting and the different types in our [blog](#).



Section 2

Mitigated Vulnerabilities (CVEs)

☐ Mitigated Vulnerabilities (CVEs)


As we examine mitigated vulnerabilities (CVEs) we found that while some are shared among industries, there are also industry-specific threats. Regardless, threat actors are trying to exploit unpatched systems and are not always using the latest vulnerabilities. (Disclaimer: The data may contain scanner activity.)

Three years after its discovery, Apache Log4J RCE (CVE-2021-44228) remains one of the most used exploits. Other vulnerabilities being exploited across industries include Microsoft Exchange server-side request forgery (SSRF, CVE-2021-26855), PHP arbitrary code execution (CVE-2017-9841), and Microsoft Exchange server-side request forgery (CVE-2022-41040).

Within the technology sector, we saw Amazon Redshift JDBC42 Remote Code Execution (CVE-2022-41828). The manufacturing sector showed significant usage of Adobe ColdFusion Insecure Deserialization (CVE-2023-26360). Within the construction sector, we saw the use of SolarView Remote Code Execution (CVE-2023-23333).

☐ Inbound Traffic

As seen in the data, newer vulnerabilities do not necessarily mean that they are the most common. The pie chart shows threat actors targeting unpatched vulnerabilities, some of which are quite old. For example, one well-known attack found across 33% of customer flows targets the PHPUnit testing framework (CVE-2017-9841), which allows for arbitrary code execution in PHP, has been around for more than seven years.




Top 10 Inbound CVE by Traffic Volume

- CVE-2017-9841 PHP arbitrary code execution vulnerability
- CVE-2021-44228 - Apache-Log4j Remote Code Execution
- CVE-2022-41040 - Microsoft Exchange server-side request forgery (SSRF)
- CVE-2022-21371 - Oracle WebLogic Server Local File Inclusion
- CVE-2021-43798 - Grafana Directory Traversal
- CVE-2021-41773 - Apache HTTP Server Path Traversal
- CVE-2018-19629 - Denial of Service vulnerability in the ImageNow Server
- CVE-2021-26855 - Microsoft Exchange server-side request forgery (SSRF)
- Dasan GPON home routers bypass authentication. This vulnerability is broadly used by Mirai and may indicate an infected device.
- CVE-2021-34523 - ProxyShell - Microsoft Exchange Server Elevation of Privilege


We have classified each CVE according to its corresponding tactic in MITRE ATT@CK Technique (see [this blog](#) for a detailed explanation of ATT@CK). Our analysis reveals that threat actors are targeting Entertainment, Telecommunication, and Mining & Metals with T1499 – Endpoint Denial of Service techniques more than other sectors.

Inbound Traffic - MITRE ATT&CK Techniques by Industry for Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)




Outbound Traffic

Outbound threats refer to traffic originating within the organization and going out to the public internet. The presence of an outbound threat may indicate that the attacker is already present within the organization and could be using the network to launch an attack on another enterprise. The most exploited vulnerabilities by outbound threats in our research were Windows MSHTML elevation of privileges (CVE-2023-29324), Apache Log4j RCE (CVE-2021-44228), and Windows DNS Remote Code Execution (CVE-2021-26897).



In the Services and Hospitality sectors, more so than others, threat actors utilize the Exploitation for Credential Access. They're trying to exploit CVE-2023-29324 for Windows MSHTML Platform Elevation of Privileges, a component in Internet Explorer used to render web pages.


Outbound Traffic - MITRE ATT&CK Techniques by Industry for Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)



WANbound Traffic

The most common vulnerability in WANbound traffic is web application-related CVEs. As you can see in the graphic, all the CVEs are related to web applications. Additionally, the percentage of WANbound traffic associated with CVE may be influenced by how many organizations are using vulnerability scanners to identify vulnerable systems within their network to prevent potential exploitation because of its severe consequences.

Mitigated Vulnerabilities (CVEs)





Top 10 WANbound CVE by Traffic Volume

- CVE-2021-44228 - Apache-Log4j Remote Code Execution
- CVE-2022-21371 - Oracle WebLogic Server Local File Inclusion
- CVE-2021-26085 - Atlassian Confluence Server Arbitrary File Read
- CVE-2022-22963 - Spring Cloud Remote Code Execution
- CVE-2021-41773 - Apache HTTP Server Path Traversal
- CVE-2009-2445 - Oracle iPlanet Web Server Sensitive Data Exposure
- CVE-2020-14750 - Oracle WebLogic Server RCE
- CVE-2013-0625 - Adobe ColdFusion Remote Code Execution

Our analysis indicates that the most commonly used CVE in the Entertainment sector is Text4Shell Apache Commons Text RCE (CVE-2022-42889). Meanwhile, in the Telecommunications sector, the most frequently used technique is Endpoint Denial of Service (T1499).

WANbound traffic - MITRE ATT&CK Techniques by Industry for Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)





Section 3


Suspicious Activity Monitoring (SAM)

📄 Suspicious Activity Monitoring (SAM)

The threat landscape is constantly evolving, providing opportunities for threat actors to exploit and compromise organizations in a covert manner. New methods of bypassing security products are revealed on a weekly basis. To remain undetected, threat actors use techniques such as LOLBAS (Living Off The Land Binaries, Scripts, and Libraries) and LOTS (Living Off Trusted Sites). However, the use of these techniques does not necessarily mean that your organization has already been compromised. Additionally, other suspicious activities, such as communication with known protocols but not via the standard port, checking public IPs (often used in malware), and other behaviors, should also be monitored.


To tackle this issue, Cato Networks has developed SAM, a set of capabilities that can detect suspicious behavior and alert the organization using XDR. Each SAM signature has an associated risk: Low, Medium, or High. We also mapped SAM signatures to their corresponding MITRE ATT@CK tactics.

Understanding and analyzing suspicious events can help reduce an organization's attack surface. By monitoring suspicious activities, we can trace them back and attribute them to specific threat actors. Based on the activity identified by monitoring these events, honeypots and deception techniques can be deployed.



Outbound SAM


We can see that the highest-risk SAMs for outbound traffic are traffic to dynamic DNS services in HTTP (44%), EXE download over non-browser HTTP traffic (28%), and a possible malicious EXE file downloaded from a WordPress site (12%). Alone, these actions would not be categorized as malicious as they do not constitute an attack. But by understanding the underlying network traffic patterns of attacks, Cato recognizes that these actions are often part of larger threat patterns -- hence the term "suspicious."



If we examine the SAMs of medium-risk activities, we observe that HTTP requests over non-standard ports to less popular destinations (21%), WinINet/Winsock (Native Windows Client) to low-popularity domains (19%), and IP checking services (11%) are ranked highest on the list.

Suspicious Activity Monitoring (SAM)


Cato's popularity score involves multiple data points, including real-time traffic data from our network, which measures the application's occurrences across our network and is correlated with additional online sources. Typically, an application that is less popular and less known poses a greater risk than a well-established domain.



Top 10 MEDIUM Risk Suspicious Activities in Outbound Traffic

- HTTP Requests Over Non Standard Ports To Low Popularity Destinations
- Wininet/Winsock (Native Windows Client) to low Popularity Domain
- IP checking services
- FTP Client (WinSCP) over SSH
- Suspicious Chrome Extensions originated not from webstore
- SAM - Outbound FileZilla traffic
- Wininet/Winsock (Native Windows Client) to low Popularity IP
- AnyDesk Remote Desktop Connection Initiation
- PuTTY SSH Connection To Low Reputation IP
- Bot downloading EXE file

In the low-risk SAMs, the top indicators are domain reputation-based signature (newly registered domain), TLS with low reputation and non-standard ports, and SSH to high ports.




Top 10 LOW Risk Suspicious Activities in Outbound Traffic

- Domain reputation based signature - Newly Registered Domain
- TLS With Low Reputation and Non-standard Ports
- SSH to High Ports
- Ms-office 2016 document autoupdate attempt.
- cURL over HTTP to low popularity domains
- Java over HTTP to low popularity domains
- Bitsadmin administration tool - using suspicious user agent & domain
- Postman over HTTP to low popularity domains
- Python over HTTP to low popularity domains
- Long DNS Query

Manufacturing, technology, and consumer goods are the most common industries that engage in suspicious activities. The most prevalent threat techniques are Application Layer Protocol (T1071), Non-Standard Port (T1571), and Ingress Tool Transfer (T1105).


Outbound Suspicious Activities by Industry Verticals



Suspicious Activity Monitoring (SAM)

WANbound SAM

We can see that the median-risk SAMs for WAN-bound traffic are LDAP Search Query – Groups (53%), Querying Groups in the Domain (28%), and Moving Executable Laterally to a Temp directory (8%).




Top 10 HIGH Risk Suspicious Activities in WANbound Traffic


- LDAP Search Query - Groups
- Querying Groups in the Domain
- Moving Executable Laterally To a Temp directory
- Execution of Remote RemCom Service
- Using PsExec to Transfer Executable in SMB
- Execution of Remote PAExec Service
- WinRM Unencrypted Execution Powershell
- PSexec Impersonates as a Regular Executable
- Transferring Mimikatz over SMB

Suspicious Activity Monitoring (SAM)

After analyzing the SAMs of WANbound traffic that pose a medium risk, we have observed that three actions are the most common. These actions include Enumerating All Users on the Domain Controller by using SAMR RPC (14%), Querying Admin Groups in the Domain (14%), and Querying a Built-in Administrator Account (12%).



In WANbound traffic, the top indicators for low-risk SAMs are remotely querying a computer using WMI, long DNS queries, and registering a new scheduled task on the remote host.





Top 10 LOW Risk Suspicious Activities in WANbound Traffic

- Remotely Querying a Computer Using WMI
- Remotely Querying a Computer Using WMI
- Registering a new scheduled task on the remote host
- Transferring a Powershell Script Over SMB

Our analysis indicates that the most commonly used CVE in the Entertainment sector is Text4Shell Apache Commons Text RCE (CVE-2022-42889). Meanwhile, in the Telecommunications sector, the most frequently used technique is Endpoint Denial of Service (T1499).

WANbound Suspicious Activities by Industry Verticals





Section 4

Enterprise Security Behavior

Enterprise Security Behavior

Enterprises have long trusted their legacy MPLS networks, sending data unencrypted and relying on edge firewalls for protection. Unfortunately, that belief continues for many today, as they use insecure protocols for their WANbound communications. This is a mistake, but it's not the only one common to enterprises. DNSSEC, which could be valuable in protecting against many attacks, has not gained momentum.


Application use of AI tools is evident across all sectors. The technology and manufacturing sectors have increased their use of AI tools monthly. We have also observed that many of the surveyed entertainment organizations lack adequate information security tools. In addition, each industry vertical uses a unique set of applications and protocols, which may expose them to different threats.

Secure vs. Insecure Protocols

One of the best ways to reduce an organization's attack surface is to use secure protocols. In this section, Cato CTRL examines the use of such protocols within the enterprise.

HTTP vs. HTTPS


The HTTP traffic analysis clearly shows that many organizations do not encrypt their WAN traffic. This means that if an adversary is already inside the organization's network, they can eavesdrop on unencrypted communications that may include personal identifiable information (PII) or sensitive information such as credentials, further helping them in their lateral movement.



Enterprise Security Behavior

After analyzing the WANbound traffic by industry verticals, we found that the top industries not using HTTPS for WAN traffic are manufacturing, consumer goods, construction, travel & tourism, and hospitality. Additionally, there is unencrypted HTTP traffic within all industry verticals.

WANbound HTTP/HTTPS Traffic by Industry Verticals




SMB v1 and v2 vs. SMB v3

The Microsoft environment has long relied on the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol for file sharing and other purposes. Our data shows that most enterprises continue to rely on SMB v1 and v2 (66%) despite their well-known vulnerabilities, such as EternalBlue and denial of service (DoS) attacks. Microsoft's latest version of the protocol, SMB v3, has fixed many of these vulnerabilities and enforces AES-128-GCM encryption, a robust encryption standard.


Enterprise Security Behavior

As we look at SMB adoption by industry, the top industries that still use SMB v1 and v2 are manufacturing, consumer goods, automotive, medical/healthcare, and finance.


SMB V1 AND V2 VS SMB V3



WANBOUND
SMB V1 AND V2 VS SMB V3



INBOUND
SMB V1 AND V2 VS SMB V3



OUTBOUND
SMB V1 AND V2 VS SMB V3




● SMB_v1_v2 ● SMB_v3


SSH vs. TELNET

SSH is the most secure method for accessing remote servers. While organizations increasingly use secure connections for inbound and outbound traffic, Telnet is still being utilized inside the organizations.


SSH vs TELNET




WANBOUND
SSH vs TELNET



INBOUND
SSH vs TELNET




OUTBOUND
SSH vs TELNET



● SSH ● TELNET


In terms of industries, our analysis shows that Telnet is more prominent than SSH in WANbound traffic for law practices, finance, automotive, mining & metals, and oil & energy sectors.

WANbound Telnet/SSH Traffic by Industry Verticals



DNS vs. DNSSEC

DNS plays a crucial role on the internet. Since DNS's invention in 1983 multiple vulnerabilities have been found, such as DNS cache poisoning and man-in-the-middle attacks. Consequently, there was a need for a more secure DNS. In 1997, the first specification of DNSSEC was published. A significant milestone in 2010 was the signing of the root zone. Cato's analysis of network traffic revealed that there has been limited adoption of DNSSEC.



LLMNR vs. NetBIOS

LLMNR and NetBIOS are both used to resolve names on local networks. LLMNR is designed as the successor of NetBIOS, aiming to provide a more secure fallback option when DNS fails. However, using LLMNR and NetBIOS can pose significant security risks, such as LLMNR poisoning, SMB Relay Attacks, Pass-the-Hash Attacks, and more. The alternative is to utilize a local DNS server. Our analysis indicates that all industry verticals still rely on LLMNR and NetBIOS, with NetBIOS being the most commonly used.


Application Usage

In addition to investigating protocol usage across enterprises, Cato CTRL investigated application usage. The Cato SASE Cloud identifies and classifies thousands of applications within the enterprise. We examined the three types of applications – AI tools, information security, and anonymizers.

AI Tools

The most common AI tools used among enterprises were Microsoft Copilot, ChatGPT, and Emol, an application that records emotions and talks with AI robots. Copilot's strong adoption is likely due to its integration across Microsoft products. The strongest adoption of these tools was seen in the travel and tourism industry (79%), and the lowest adoption was among entertainment organizations (44%).


AI Tools Apps Usage by Industry Vertical



Information Security

How are companies protecting their information assets? It depends on who you ask. The vast majority of educational organizations (82%) use information security tools, versus less than half (48%) of entertainment organizations. The most used information security tools are: TrendMicro, Umbrella, Bitdefender, Quad9, and ESET.


Information Security Apps Usage by Industry Vertical




Anonymizers

When enterprises are looking to mask their browsing habits, Internet addresses, and otherwise hide personal identifiable information, they turn to Anonymizers. The most commonly used anonymizers include NordVPN, Surfshark VPN, Mullvad VPN, Hola VPN, and AdGuard. Travel & tourism organizations are the biggest users of Anonymizers (74%), perhaps reflecting the need to see local sites in planning trips that would not be viewable from other regions, versus less than a third of entertainment organizations.

Anonymizers Apps Usage by Industry Vertical





Section 5


Hacking Communities

Hacking Communities

As part of Cato CTRL's activity, we use HUMINT and OSINT to monitor for threat actor activities. These activities include discussions, the buying and selling of goods and services, and other related actions taken by potential adversaries. With the recent hype around LLMs (Large Language Models) we decided to focus on threat actors' adoption of AI/ML technologies.


Tooling

Across underground discussions, threat actors complained about the limitations imposed by LLMs on what they can have it perform. When the first chat based LLMs came out, the guardrails were not high. As a result, prompts that could potentially create malicious code and content. Today, most LLMs have rules guarding against producing anything from potentially harmful content to potentially copyrighted materials. Here is one example, out of many, of how threat actors are looking for ways to jailbreak ChatGPT to create custom SQLMap commands:



🔍 Hacking Communities

We also observed another automated web scanner that uses AI to parse the result and adjust the command. It uses the open-source LLAMA model by Meta:



Translation of the text -

"Advantages:

Automation of penetration testing processes.

Intelligent analysis of reports and recommendations for the elimination of vulnerabilities.

Flexible settings and the ability to adapt to specific needs.


The Llama model was used for report analysis, you can take a look at the characteristics here https://github.com/facebookresearch/llama/blob/main/MODEL_CARD.md

A couple of screenshots of the project's work"

🔍 Deep Fakes

Underground services and products are not limited to malware and phishing. Fake credentials have been bought and sold for years, and are still a thriving industry, now fueled by the power of AI to generate top-end products. From fake videos that can beat biometric authentication to creation of documents and scans threat actors are experimenting with ML models to conduct malicious activity.

In the example below, threat actors test and share their opinions on new models that are hosted on the Hugging Face platform ([see the platform here](#))




Translation of the text -

"This neural network will copy any voice and use it to voice your text. They've just rolled out a powerful speech synthesizer, Whisper Speech — the generation results are really impressive!

Listen for yourself how convincingly the AI copied Peter Griffin — the written text literally spoke with his voice.

Grab the free tool here. (<https://huggingface.co/spaces/collabora/WhisperSpeech>)"

In this conversation, we see threat actors discussing a real-time deep fake cloning service:





Translation of the text -

"Camerai - a service for creating deepfakes. To start working, you need to write any personality as a prompt and connect a camera. Everything else is done by the neural network. <https://www.fal.ai/camera>

Are there services that can create a voice message from a voice pattern and text?"


Hacking Communities

Criminals are looking particularly to generate fake documents, so why not use machine learning for such tasks? One attacker did just that:



Careers and Development


Creating custom ML models like LLM, training models, and fine-tuning models requires work and expertise. In recent months, we have seen people marketing their ML expert services in underground forums and cybercrime groups looking to hire such experts to help them design their own malicious GPT variant.



Translation of the text -

"Clustering, Gradient Boosting (xgboost, LightGBM, CatBoost), k-means... I possess skills in Feature Engineering (construction of parameters from existing data). I am adept at fine-tuning settings and hyperparameters for algorithms, optimal metrics for assessing model performance. I have worked with metrics such as Accuracy, precision, recall, F1-Score, AUC, average precision, balanced accuracy, mse, rmse, mspe, mae,

The main language of programming - python. Jabber - IM Telegram: @dscoder"



Threat actors are also recruiting AI/ML specialists to build custom LLMs for malicious intent ([see this blog](#)).



Section 6

Recommended Actions


Based on the above findings, Cato CTRL recommends enterprise IT and security leaders take five actions:

- 1. Monitor your WAN traffic to check which insecure protocols you use and switch to secure protocols. Continuing to run insecure protocols makes it easier for threat actors to gather information, steal confidential information traversing the network, and exploit vulnerabilities.
- 2. Implement Zero-Trust strategies in your organization. Zero-Trust restricts users' access to only the necessary resources, minimizing the attack surface in the event of stolen credentials or similar attacks.
- 3. Disable LLMNR and NetBIOS and use local DNS servers. As noted, both LLMNR and NetBIOS pose significant security risks, which could be mitigated by relying on local DNS servers.
- 4. Deploy vulnerability scanning in your network to find vulnerabilities and improve your organization's security posture. Many attacks exploit vulnerabilities that are quite old and simply haven't been patched. Scanning for and identifying those vulnerabilities will go a long way to improving the enterprise's risk posture.
- 5. Asset management is critical to mapping services, applications, and third-party packages to detect exploitable old services and applications. Only once mapped and understood can security teams replace the insecure protocols and remediate the unpatched services within the enterprise, reducing the attack surface.

About Cato Networks

Cato Networks is the leader in SASE, delivering enterprise security and network access in a single cloud platform. With Cato, organizations replace costly and rigid legacy infrastructure with an open and modular SASE architecture based on SD-WAN, a purpose-built global cloud network, and an embedded cloud-native security stack.

Cato SASE Cloud Platform



Cato. WE ARE SASE.

Cato SASE Cloud Platform

Connect

- Cloud Network
- Cloud On-Ramps

Protect

- Network Security
- Endpoint Security

Detect

- Incident Life Cycle Management

Run

- Unified Management and API

Use Cases

Network Transformation

- MPLS to SD-WAN Migration
- Global Access Optimization
- Hybrid Cloud and Multi-Cloud Integration

Business Transformation

- Vendor Consolidation
- Spend Optimization
- M&A and Geo Expansion

Security Transformation

- Secure Hybrid Work
- Secure Direct Internet Access
- Secure Application and Data Access
- Incident Detection and Response